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EXECUTIVE POWER - EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE - PRIVILEGE OF EXECUTIVE TO SHIELD INFORMATION FROM
DISCOVERY - DOCTRINE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
RECOGNIZED IN MARYLAND TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE
OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION. HAMILTON v. VERDOW,
287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of executive privilege has long been used in
federal courts to shield official information from public
disclosure.' In Hamilton v. Verdow, 2 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered, for the first time, whether a confidential
report prepared at the request of the Governor of Maryland was
protected by this privilege.3 The court incorporated the doctrine of
executive privilege into the law of Maryland,4 but held that an in
camera inspection of the report in question would not be
improper. 5
This casenote analyzes the scope and effect of the Hamilton
decision. In addition, it examines the policy reasons behind the
privilegee and attempts to clarify the position adopted by the
court in Hamilton.
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF HAMILTON
While on leave from a Maryland state psychiatric hospital,
Arthur F. Goode, III killed a young boy, Jason S. Verdow, in
Florida.7 Verdow's estate brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland against the hospital
superintendent and two staff psychiatrists, for their alleged negligence in recommending that Goode be treated at the hospital

1. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966),
affd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied,
389 U.S. 952 (1967).
2. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
3. Id at 553-56, 414 A.2d at 920-21.
4. Id at 562, 414 A.2d at 924.
5. Id at 567-70, 414 A.2d at 927-28.
6. This note is confined to the judicial proceedings aspect of the executive privilege. For
comprehensive discussions of the privilege as it relates to congressional proceedings,
see Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1419-38 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Cox]; Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1974); Gard, Executive Privilege: A Rhyme Without a Reason, 8
GA. L. REV. 809 (1974).
7. Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 547, 414 A.2d 914, 917 (1980). Goode had entered
Spring Grove State Hospital in Catonsville, Maryland in 1975, as a condition of probation, after having been convicted of sexually molesting male minors. Id at 546, 414
A.2d at 916. Shortly after killing Verdow, Goode killed another youth in Virginia.
Having been convicted of murder in both Florida and Virginia, Goode is currently
awaiting execution in a Florida prison. Id at 546-47, 414 A.2d at 917.
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rather than at a maximum security institution, in failing to prescribe adequate treatment for Goode, and in allowing him to leave
the hospital without notifying any appropriate authority2
During discovery, the personal representative of Verdow's
estate sought the production of an investigative report that had
been prepared for the Governor of Maryland by a member of his
staff concerning Goode's progress and treatment at the hospital. 9
The Maryland Attorney General and the Acting Governor of
Maryland'0 requested a protective order to prevent the plaintiff
from obtaining a copy of the report. The officials supported this
request by stating that "the report was a confidential report, prepared for the purpose of future executive action in order to
attempt to prevent other similar occurrences at state facilities,
and contained opinions and recommendations for the Governor's
use as well as other confidential, personal information relating to
Goode." 1
The federal district court initially ordered that the report be
produced to aid the court in determining, through an in camera
inspection, the extent to which the material merited protection.
However, due to the absence of controlling precedent in Maryland
on the doctrine of executive privilege, certification was made to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland on the question of whether the
report should be kept from discovery and in camera inspection
based upon this privilege.2

8. 1I at 547, 414 A.2d at 917. These claims were premised on the theory that the defendants knew that Goode had not responded to their treatment and still possessed
criminal tendencies. I&
9. The plaintiff also sought the production of Goode's medical records, for which Goode
claimed a privilege under § 9-109 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Code Annotated. I& at 547-50, 414 A.2d at 917-18. This statute protects "communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of [a] patient's mental or emotional disorder." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109(b) (1980). A patient may consent to
waive the privilege. I& § 9-109(d)(6). The Hamilton court held that Goode had waived
this privilege by previously authorizing the release of his medical records to other
plaintiffs in a case against the same defendants, involving the same issues as
Hamilton. 287 Md. 544, 550-51, 414 A.2d 914, 918-19 (1980).
10. Acting Governor Blair Lee, III made the original claim of executive privilege in this
case, and the present Governor Harry R. Hughes reiterated it. The investigative
report had been prepared at the request of former Governor Marvin Mandel. 287 Md.
544, 548 n.1, 414 A.2d 914, 917 n.1 (1980).
11. Id. at 548, 414 A.2d at 917.
12. 1I at 548-49, 414 A.2d at 917-18. The Court of Appeals of Maryland is empowered
to receive and answer questions of law certified to it by certain state and federal
courts, including United States district courts, in cases in which: (1) the question may
be determinative of a cause pending in the certifying court, and (2) there is no controlling precedent in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. MD. CS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 12-601 (1980).
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III. BACKGROUND OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
A. Origin of the Doctrine
The Constitution of the United States does not expressly
establish an executive privilege to withhold information from the
courts or a judicial power to obtain information withheld by the
executive.13 As a result, much controversy has arisen over judicial
recognition of an executive privilege."' Whether advocating total
rejection of the privilege, adoption of an absolute privilege, or an
intermediate view, each position is rooted in this country's constitutional separation of powers and varying interpretations of the
holding in United States v. Burr.5
In the earliest American case dealing with executive privilege,
Aaron Burr, on trial for treason16 and for leading troops against a
foreign power with which the United States was at peace, 7
demanded to see letters containing incriminating information
about him, which were in the possession of President Jefferson.' s
Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as trial judge in Burr, issued
two subpoenas to President Jefferson, one to appear personally as
a witness and the other to produce the letters. 9 Although the
President ignored the subpoena to testify and denied that the
court was empowered to issue it, he partially complied with the
order to produce the letters by submitting excerpted versions of
them to the court. 20 The deletions were made by Jefferson's attorney, who avowed that the parts omitted contained state secrets
and were neither relevant nor necessary to Burr's defense. 21
Although only partial compliance with the subpoena had thus
been effected, Chief Justice Marshall did not pursue the matter
2
further.
13. Cox, supra note 6. at 1384.
14. See Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 10 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Berger]; Cox, supra note 6, at 1384.
15. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d.); 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,694). The Burr cases were decided by Chief Justice John Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court, sitting on the circuit court. In the early nineteenth century, it
was common practice for Justices of the Supreme Court to sit on the circuit courts.
O'Brien, The Dissenting Opinions of Nixon v. Sirica: An Argument for Executive
Privilege in the White House Tapes Controversy, 28 Sw. L.J. 373, 380 (1974) [hereinafter cited as O'Brien]. For the purposes of this note, the Burr cases will be referred to
collectively.
16. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d.).
17. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
18. O'Brien, supra note 15, at 380. General James Wilkinson, who had been a close friend
of Burr's, had written the letters to Jefferson, exposing Burr and his conspiracy. Id
at 379-80.
19. 25 F. Cas. 30, 37-38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d.).
20. 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); see Berger, supra note 14, at 5-6;
Cox, supra note 6, at 1392; O'Brien, supra note 15, at 380-83.
21. O'Brien, supra note 15, at 381.
22. Id at 387.

388

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 10

Based upon Burr and the separation of powers doctrine,
several positions on the executive privilege issue have emerged.
One school of thought, which is in favor of an absolute privilege,
asserts that the executive privilege is inherent in the powers
granted to the President in article II of the United States Constitution. 23 The separation of powers doctrine is, therefore, interpreted as "mak[ing] one master in his own house" and
"preclud[ing] him from imposing his control in the house of
another who is master there.'"24 Under this line of reasoning, chief
executives possess an absolute privilege to withhold information
and the ultimate power to determine when that privilege may
properly be invoked. 5 Courts may not impose their control over
26
an executive official by regulating his use of the privilege.
Burr has been read to support this position.2 7 In Burr, the
President himself determined the scope of the privilege, by directing his attorney to delete all irrelevant portions of the letters
before delivering them to the court. 28 Although the Chief Justice
acknowledged the judiciary's power to require the executive to
produce evidence, the court appeared to accept Jefferson's judgment, stating that "in no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the President as against an ordinary individual. '29 This passage has been construed to indicate the
30
judiciary's lack of power over the Chief Executive.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who view recognition of the privilege as "open[ing] the door to unchecked executive
power, an evil dreaded by the Founders." 31 This position places far

23. See Brief for Respondent at 49, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Cox,
supra note 6,at 1387; O'Brien, supra note 15, at 374.
24. Brief for Respondent at 74, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (quoting
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935)).
25. See Reply Brief for Respondent at 3, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Apparently, under this view, all an executive official need do is make a claim of
privilege, and the request for production will be denied. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 762-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
26. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 750-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting);
Reply Brief for Respondent at 3, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
O'Brien, supra note 15, at 374-76.
27. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 15, at 380.
28. See text accompanying notes 20 & 21 supra
29. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
30. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 781-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
31. Berger, supra note 14, at 4-5 (citing R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 49-50, 53, 58, 62 (1974)). The view of the Founders was expressed by
James Wilson, who represented Pennsylvania at the Constitutional Convention in
1787: "The executive power is better to be trusted when it has no screen ....[The
President cannot] hide either his negligence or inattention; ... not a single privilege
is annexed to his character." 2 J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1836) (emphasis in original).
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greater confidence in the courts than in the executive branch and
would always require the latter to yield to judicial control over the
evidence in a case.32 Thus, executive officials would be obliged to
deliver all requested material to the court, which would then determine whether such33 material should be made available to the
requesting litigant.
Support for this position also has been found in Burr. 3 4 Chief
Justice Marshall emphasized that a president's asserted need for
nondisclosure must yield to a litigant's need for evidence. 3 Fur-

thermore, President Jefferson exhibited a willingness to supply
the court with any materials it might find relevant and necessary
to the trial. 36 This has been interpreted as evidence of Jefferson's

ultimate concession to the power of the court to decide
which
37
materials should be disclosed to a demanding litigant.
The position taken by all courts that have addressed the issue
represents a compromise between these two opposing views. First
enunciated in Burr to protect state secrets at the President's
request, the privilege has been extended to protect military
secrets 3 and confidential communications. 39 Thus recognized to
exist, the privilege must be asserted by the head of the executive
agency or department seeking nondisclosure.40 The executive official's claim of privilege, however, is not conclusive; the applicabil41
ity and scope of the privilege are judicially determined.

32. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953); Berger, supra note 14, at
28.
33. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1409.
34. See, e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 187-94 (1974).
35. 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d.); 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,694); see Berger, supra note 14, at 6-7. Although commentators who oppose
the privilege rely on this passage from Burr for support, the actual statement made in
the case by Chief Justice Marshall included the important qualification that there
had been no showing that the letters sought by Burr contained "any matter, the disclosure of which would endanger the public safety." 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (No. 14,692d.); 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). Read in its
entirety, this passage appears to support the executive privilege doctrine as it exists
today. See text accompanying notes 38-60 infra.
36. See 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); O'Brien, supra note 15, at 384.
37. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 6.
38. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
39. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denie4, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp.
939 (Ct. CL 1958).
40. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
41. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1, 8-10 (1953); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973). This rule is based
on the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that "li]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." Id. at 177.
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Scope of the Privilege

Federal courts have held that state secrets, including diplomatic, military, and sensitive security matters, are absolutely
privileged from disclosure. 42 When one of these areas is asserted
as the basis of the privilege, a court may not automatically
examine the document in question, but must consider, through
testimony, the validity of the assertion.43 A court will not require
disclosure of materials alleged to contain state secrets unless it
finds the claim of privilege to have been arbitrarily or capriciously
asserted. 44 If such a finding is made, the materials may be subject
to both in camera inspection
by the court and disclosure to the
4 5
requesting litigant.
Confidential communications enjoy only a qualified privilege
in the federal courts. 46 In determining which confidential communications should be disclosed and which should not, the court is
involved in a balancing process. The court must weigh the public's
interest in free access to information that would facilitate a just
resolution of a legal dispute against the compelling public need for
confidentiality.4 7 Subject to this limitation, an executive has a
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of intragovernmental
documents containing advisory opinions, recommendations, or
deliberations used in formulating governmental policies and decisions.4 8 Furthermore, the executive privilege does not protect government documents consisting solely of factual data.49 If factual
and deliberative materials are intertwined,
all severable factual
50
material will be subject to disclosure.

42. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105 (1875); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
478 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 107 (2d ed. 1972);
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378(g)(2) (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). See generally Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 166,
177-79 (1958).
43. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 51
(4th Cir. 1973).
44. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973).
45. See id
46. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 706 (1974).
47. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), affd
sub nor. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 389
U.S. 952 (1967); see Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280
F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Cox, supra note 6, at 1408.
49. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d
654, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
50. See cases cited note 49 supra.
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The Freedom of Information Act of 19661 includes provisions
relating to executive privilege on the federal level.2 This Act provides that governmental agencies shall make a broad range of
information accessible to the public.53 However, matters relating
to national defense or foreign policy 5 4 and other material that
would be unavailable to a private litigant in a suit against a government agency" 5 are exempted from the operation of the Act. The
latter provision demonstrates a congressional intent to incorpoof executive privilege
rate in the Act the common law doctrine
56
relating to confidential communications.
The privilege of an executive official to insulate governmental
information from public disclosure has been codified in several
states.5 7 Other states have adopted the doctrine judicially." In
most areas, state executive officials enjoy substantially the same
qualified privilege for confidential communications as do federal
executive officials.5 9 The state and federal privileges are distinguishable, however, because the privilege based on diplomatic and
within the exclusive domain of the
military secrets is generally
60
federal government.

51. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
52. See id

See idL § 522(a).
Id. § 522(b)(1).
Id § 522(b)(5).
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973). See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.Article 76A of the Maryland Annotated Code contains provisions relating to maintenance
and disclosure of "public information." MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, §§ 1-5 (1980). Section 3(b)(v) thereof is substantially similar to 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(5).
57. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (West 1966), construed in In re Lynna B., 92 Cal.
App. 3d 682, 155 CaL Rptr. 256 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979), construed in
City of Portland v. Nudelman, 45 Or. App. 425, 608 P.2d 1190 (1980). For additional
statutes, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378(g), at 799-800 n.9 (J. McNaughton rev.
1961).
58. See, e.g., Assured Investors Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Assocs., 362 So. 2d 228
(Ala. 1978); Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 316 N.E.2d 301, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1974).

53.
54.
55.
56.

59. Comment, Executive Privilege at the State Leve

1974 U. ILL. L.F. 631, 646. The

author notes that "this qualified privilege does not attach to all communications
between public officials. Only communications made by an official in the course of his
official duties and in the public interest are protected by the privilege." Id. (footnote
omitted).
60. Id. at 645 (citing Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege,50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966)); see
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10. There are instances, however, in which the privilege for
diplomatic and military secrets may be asserted by a state official. For example, art.
I, § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution impliedly empowers states to compact
with other states or with foreign states and to declare war when actually invaded. In
addition, art. I, § 8, cl. 10 of the United States Constitution reserves to the states the
authority to maintain and deploy their National Guard units. Materials prepared by
executive officials in connection with the exercise of these powers would presumably
be protected from disclosure in judicial proceedings by the executive privilege.
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C. The Use of In Camera Inspection
Ordinarily, the claim of privilege must be asserted by the head
of the executive agency or department seeking to prevent disclosure.6 1 When such a claim is made, the documents in question are
automatically presumed to be privileged from any type of examination.6 2 The presumption may be rebutted, however, if the person
seeking disclosure makes a preliminary showing that the material
is not privileged, 63 or that there is a substantial need for disclosure
of the material despite any existing privilege.64 Once either has
6 5
been demonstrated, the court may order an in camera inspection
of the material.

66

When documents are alleged to contain purely factual and,
thus, discoverable information, 67 in camera inspection by the court
is used to determine whether or not the documents sought are
privileged. 6 Another function of the in camera procedure is to

sever privileged from non-privileged, discoverable material, if possible.69 Finally, in those situations involving confidential communications, which enjoy only a qualified privilege, 70 the in camera
examination is used to balance the litigant's need 71for production
against the government's need for confidentiality.
Throughout the in camera proceeding, the court must con72
stantly consider the relevance and admissibility of the evidence.
If material is found to be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, the

61. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
62. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
730 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-25 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub
nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S.
952 (1967).
63. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
64. E.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 730-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It
should be noted that materials containing state secrets will never be discoverable,
regardless of the litigants' need. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supr.
65. "A cause is said to be heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the judge
in his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

66.
67.
68.
69.

684 (5th ed. 1979).

See cases cited notes 63 & 64 supra.
See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Id.
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 331-32 (D.D.C. 1966),
affd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied,
389 U.S. 952 (1967). For example, this procedure would be appropriate when factual
data is allegedly intertwined with privileged advisory opinions. See id.; Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
70. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713-14 (1974).
71. Id; Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 730-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 331 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
72. See Cox, supra note 6, at 1414.
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court will exclude it on that basis, regardless of whether the
material is privileged.13 Because governmental information is
seldom relevant in civil or criminal litigation, 74 the threat of disclosure is minimal. This, together with the executive privilege doctrine, makes it unlikely that the spontaneity or candor of commuwill be hampered markedly
nications within the executive branch
75
because of fear of public exposure.

IV. THE HAMILTON COURT'S ANALYSIS
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not address
the issue of executive privilege until Hamilton v. Verdow, 76 it had
previously recognized "that the Governor bears the same relation
to [Maryland] as does the President to the United States, and that
generally the Governor is entitled to the same privileges and
exemptions in the discharge of his duties as is the President."' 77 In

addition, the court had acknowledged prior to Hamilton that the
separation of powers doctrine78 limits the judiciary's authority to
interfere in the "conclusions, acts or decisions of a coordinate79
branch of government made within its own sphere of authority. ,
In Hamilton, the court recognized the doctrine of executive
privilege as part of the law of Maryland.80
Having made that threshold determination, the court focused
upon whether the investigative report, prepared in confidence for
the Governor of Maryland for the purpose of possible executive
action, was guarded from discovery and in camera examination on

73. Id
74. Id at 1411; Comment, Executive Privilegeat the State Leve 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 631,
645.
75. Cox, supra note 6, at 1413; Comment, Executive Privilege at the State Leve 1974 U.
ILL. L.F. 631, 645.
76. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
77. Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 554, 556, 414 A.2d 914, 921 (1980) (citing Magruder v.
Swann, 25 Md. 173, 212 (1866); Miles v. Bradford, 22 Md. 170, 184-85 (1864)).
78. Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that "the Legislative,
Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." MD. CONST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 8.
79. Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 556, 414 A.2d 914, 921 (1980) (citing Department
of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514
(1975) (power of court to interfere with administrative board); Heaps v. Cobb, 185
Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945) (same); Magruder v. Swann, 25 Md. 173 (1866) (power of
court to issue writ of mandamus to Governor in discharge of ministerial duties); Miles
v. Bradford, 22 Md. 170 (1864) (no power to issue writ of mandamus to Governor for
discharge of discretionary duty); Green v. Purnell, 12 Md. 329 (1858) (no power to
issue writ of mandamus to Comptroller of Treasury in discharge of discretionary
duty); Watkins v. Watkins, 2 Md. 341 (1852) (power of court to restrain unconstitutional legislative enactments)).
80. 287 Md. 544, 562, 414 A.2d 914, 924 (1980).
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privilege.8

The Governor alleged that the
the basis of executive
report contained, inter alia, a staff member's "confidential
'opinions, recommendations, and deliberations.., for use by the
Governor in deciding what executive action, if any, was appropriate.' "s2 The court had little doubt that the material would be privileged, "without any need for" an in camera inspection, were it
essentially comprised of such materials. 83 The plaintiff asserted,
and the Governor's affidavit confirmed, however, that the report
was basically factual.4 In addition, the plaintiff exhibited a willingness to forego any advisory opinions or recommendations that
may have been part of the report, 5 requesting only those portions
of the report consisting of "statements of witnesses and psychiatrists, records of Goode's prior arrests, medical and educational
records from institutions other than [the hospital] and conclusions
of psychiatrists that the doctors at [the hospital] had 'misdiagnosed' Goode. 8 s6 This combination of factors was deemed by
the court to constitute a sufficient showing to overcome the presumptive privilege that attaches to governmental documents. An
in camera examination of the report, therefore, was held not to be
inconsistent with
the executive privilege doctrine that had just
7
been adopted.
The court then suggested guidelines for the federal district
court's in camera inspection. Although some factual material in
the report may have been entitled to protection, such as information obtained upon promise of confidentiality, that material was
not determined to require the same degree of privilege as were
advisory opinions and materials of a similarly deliberative
nature.8 8 Consequently, the court suggested a balancing of the
Governor's asserted reasons for nondisclosure against the plaintiff's need for disclosure, 9 in order to determine which information

81. Id at 567-70, 414 A.2d at 927-28. It should be remembered that the court in
Hamilton was responding to a certified question from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland. Therefore, the court's opinion in this case differs
from one rendered on appeal from a final decision of a Maryland trial court, in that no
determination of the issue had yet been made. See id at 569 n.9, 414 A.2d at 928 n.9.
82. Id at 567, 414 A.2d at 927 (quoting 1 8 of the gubernatorial affidavit).

83. Id
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at

568-70, 414 A.2d at 927-28.
567, 414 A.2d at 927.
568, 414 A.2d at 927.
567, 414 A.2d at 927.

88. Id
89. See id at 569, 414 A.2d at 928.
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in the report would be discoverable. 90 In this manner, the court
effectively advanced the public policy of encouraging the free flow
of information among government officials by protecting the
deliberative processes of the Governor and his supportive staff.91
V. ANALYSIS
Hamilton v. Verdow 92 represents Maryland's adoption of the
doctrine of executive privilege. One aspect of the court's opinion,
however, may be viewed as diverging from the national trend.
This is the extent to which advisory opinions and deliberations are
to be covered by the privilege.
Governmental communications containing confidential recommendations and advice generally enjoy only a qualified privilege93 However, at one point, the Hamilton court stated that, had
the report in question consisted mainly of such deliberative matter, "there could be little doubt that ... it would be privileged
without any need for an in camera inspection.'11 This statement
may be interpreted by later courts as sanctioning an absolute
privilege for executive recommendations and opinions. Such an
interpretation clearly would be at odds with the established doctrine and may conceivably invite wholesale withholding of information by an executive official.
A claim of absolute executive privilege for confidential communications of policy and advice was at issue in United States v.
Nixon.95 In this case, President Nixon had asserted an indefeasible
right to prevent a federal district court from gaining access to the

90. The court also suggested other theories under which the report may be discoverable.
For example, the court indicated that Goode may have waived his privilege to protect
much of the data contained in the report by having released that data previously to a
litigant in a similar case. Id at 570, 414 A.2d at 928. See note 9 supra. In addition, the
plaintiff claimed that Governor Mandel had waived the entire executive privilege.
The court declined to consider that claim because it had been insufficiently
developed. 287 Md. 544, 570 n.10, 414 A.2d 914, 928 n.10 (1980).
91. 287 Md. 544, 560-61, 414 A.2d 914, 923-24 (1980) (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-26 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nom V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967)).
92. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
93. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966),
affd sub nonm V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied,
389 U.S. 952 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp.
939 (Ct. CL 1958); Cox, supra note 6, at 1416.
94. 287 Md. 544, 567, 414 A.2d 914, 927 (1980) (emphasis added).
95. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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"Watergate tapes" by claiming that the tapes were confidential."
The Supreme Court found the executive privilege to be "fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution."9 7 Nevertheless,
the Court held that a claim of privilege based only on an unspecified interest in confidentiality "must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."98 The Court
reasoned that:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or
sensitive security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the
[President's] argument that even the very important
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications
is significantly diminished by production of such [confidential] material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. 99
Thus, the order requiring President Nixon to surrender the tapes
to the district court was affirmed.10 0
Although the holding in Nixon was limited to claims of privilege in criminal trials, its rationale is also applicable to civil proceedings.10 1 The Hamilton court, in determining the applicability
of the privilege in a civil context, relied in part upon the Nixon
rationale to support its conclusion that "confidential advisory and
deliberative communications" among members of the executive
branch are entitled to some protection from disclosure.102
If the Hamilton court intended to endorse an absolute privilege for confidential communications, its rationale for such a decision may have been based on the holdings of federal courts.
Although all courts that have considered the issue treat the privilege as a qualified one, no civil cases, other than actions to review
agency procedures, have required the production of documents
containing opinions and recommendations.103 This is presumably
due to the litigants' failure to make an adequate showing of need

96. Id at 686. The proceeding pending before the federal district court was criminal in
nature. Following an indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by White
House staff members and Nixon supporters, Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox filed a
motion under rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a subpoena for the
pretrial production of tapes and documents regarding specific conversations and
meetings, in which the President and others were involved. Id. at 686-88.
97. Id at 708 (footnote omitted).
98. Id at 713.
99. Id at 706.
100. Id at 714.
101. Berger, supra note 14, at 8, 10.
102. 287 Md. 544, 558, 414 A.2d 914, 922 (1980).
103. Cox, supra note 6, at 1416, 1417.
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for the material when seeking disclosure.104 It is possible, therefore, that the Hamilton court's ostensible sanction of an unqualified privilege for advisory communications was based upon a
belief that no litigant's need for disclosure would ever outweigh an
executive's need for nondisclosure. Were this true, it would be the
practical equivalent of an absolute privilege, so that in camera
inspection would be unnecessary.
In spite of the ambiguous language, it is probable that the
Hamilton court did not propose to authorize an absolute privilege
for confidential communications when it stated that such matters
"would be privileged without any need for an in camera inspection."' 10 The court had earlier recognized the doctrine "essentially
as set forth" in federal decisions. 10 6 It seems logical, therefore,
that the court intended to indicate only that an in camera inspection would not be necessary to determine that confidential communications are qualifiedly privileged, because such communications always enjoy a qualified privilege.107 As this is consistent
with precedent, 08 courts in the future should interpret the Hamilton decision in this way.
Preservation of the confidentiality of governmental documents containing advice or deliberations used in formulating governmental policies and decisions is laudable for two reasons. Confidentiality promotes the exchange of completely candid advice by
executive aides and colleagues by reducing the risk that such discussions will be publicly disclosed, criticized, or avenged, and it
allows the President or other executive the liberty to "think out
loud," unhampered by the possibility that his every thought,
whether acted upon or not, will be exposed to the public.'0 9 These
justifications are no doubt worthy of consideration, but they
should not be taken to authorize liberal application of the
privilege. Rather, it is necessary to examine the countervailing
policy arguments in favor of disclosure.
First, there is the consideration that the framers of the United
States Constitution declined to expressly authorize secrecy in the
executive branch, although such a provision was made for Con-

104. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 730-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Berger, supra note 14, at 13 (construing United States v.
Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on othergrounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
105. 287 Md. 544, 567, 414 A.2d 914, 927 (1980).
106. Id at 562, 414 A.2d at 924.
107. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
109. International Paper Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 438 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40
F.R.D. 318, 324-26 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nor. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Cox, supra note 6, at 1410.
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gress. 110 This lack of protection for executive secrecy may indicate
an intention to preclude such secrecy, 1 notwithstanding the fact
that executive officials regularly engage in deliberative, policymaking discussions much like those conducted by Congress.
In addition, the fact that the United States flourished from
1789 to 1954, under a government whose executive branch
operated without the benefit of a privilege for confidential communications, refutes the contention that protection of candid interchange among executive officials and aides is indispensable to
good government.1 1 2 During this period, innumerable investigations of the executive branch were conducted, the records of which
was ever claimed as a
disclose no evidence that "confidentiality"
11 3
basis for nondisclosure of documents.
The argument premised upon the vital role of the privilege is
further discounted because claims of executive privilege were
seldom asserted during the administrations of President Kennedy
and Johnson, with no appreciable detriment to the administration
of government. 1 4 Moreover, statements made by former President Nixon, in reference to his refusal to release the Watergate
tapes, suggest that information is sometimes withheld to avoid
and
embarrassment or conceal matters that should be made public
5
not to encourage free discussion among policy-makers.1
Finally, consideration should be given to litigants' needs for
executive documents. Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the
court in United States v. Burr,16 considered it a "very serious
thing" to deprive an individual of the power to make use of a governmental document containing information material to his
case." 7 The enforcement of substantial rights may depend upon a
party's access to information that the government claims to be
confidential and, thus, privileged. This fact makes the use of a
balancing approach imperative in cases in which an executive
seeks to prevent discovery of governmental documents.
These competing considerations have been reconciled by the
law governing disclosure of governmental communications. Confidential information enjoys only a qualified privilege that may be
defeated in cases in which the litigants' needs for governmental
documents outweigh the desirability of nondisclosure as a means
110. Congress is required to keep and publish journals, except "such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. The Maryland Constitution,
on the other hand, does not authorize secrecy in either the legislative or the executive
branch. The General Assembly is required, without exception, to "keep a journal of
its proceedings, and cause the same to be published." MD. CONST. art. III, § 22.

111. R.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:

A

CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH

Id at 44-45.
Id
Id at 252.
See Berger, supra note 14, at 27 n.132.
25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
Id at 192.

206 (1974).
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of promoting governmental efficiency.1 1 8 In addition to resolving
these competing interests, other policies are also served by current application of the executive privilege.
Establishment of a presumptive privilege whenever a formal
claim is made by an executive indicates a policy of initial deference to that separate-but-equal branch of government.1 1 9 This
same policy is evidenced by the in camera procedure; a court protects governmental material as much as possible, by "separat[ing]
the parts which are relevant and otherwise admissible, and
return[ing] the rest under seal"' 20 to the executive.
The doctrine of executive privilege also evidences a great
respect for the independent operation of the judicial system.
President Nixon's assertion in United States v. Nixon 2 ' that his
decision was dispositive of whether documents were privileged
was rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis that it is the

province and duty of the courts "to say what the law

'122
is.

In

addition, the rejection of an absolute executive privilege is
premised upon the theory that to uphold such a privilege would
severely impair the role of the courts under article III of the
United States Constitution12 3 to determine the facts necessary to
resolve the question of the admissibility of evidence. 24 As the
Nixon Court reasoned, privileges are "exceptions to the demand
for every man's evidence [and] are not lightly created nor expansively construed for they are in derogation of the search for
truth.' '125
Maryland's recognition of the doctrine of executive privilege
in Hamilton v. Verdow 1 26 reflects an equitable harmonization of
these considerations. Additionally, the court of appeals' conclusion that an in camera inspection would be permissible under the
circumstances of the case is sound under the doctrine. The report
sought by the plaintiff in Hamilton contained only factual data
and related recommendations. No military or state secrets were at

118. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
728 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318. 324
(D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nonm V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
119. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
120. Cox, supra note 6, at 1408 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16
(1974)).
121. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
122. Id.at 705 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
123. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
124. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
125. 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
126. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
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stake, 27 although the court indicated that these would be protected from even an in camera inspection, should the issue ever
arise.

28

The court's decision is consistent with the great weight of

authority in holding that a preliminary demonstration that the
information sought is purely factual or otherwise outside the
scope of the privilege will overcome the presumptive privilege and
legitimatize an in camera examination by the court. 129
VI. CONCLUSION
In Hamilton v. Verdow,1 10 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
adopted the doctrine of executive privilege. An in camera inspection of a confidential report prepared for the Governor by a staff
member was held to be proper under the newly recognized doctrine, because the plaintiff had made a sufficient preliminary
showing that the report may not be privileged as it was basically
of a factual nature. This holding represents the most equitable
resolution of the conflicting claims asserted by the plaintiff and
the Governor. It protects a litigant's evidentiary need for certain
information contained in government documents, and it simultaneously promotes appropriate respect for the free and candid
exchange of information among government advisors, which facilitates the decision-making process of the executive branch of
government.
JoAnn Ellinghaus-Jones

127. Such matters would not often arise in state cases. Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege,
50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966); see Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 563 n.5, 414 A.2d
914, 925 n.5 (1980).
128. 287 Md. 544, 563, 414 A.2d 914, 924-25 (1980).
129. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
130. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).

